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Indian Status, Band Membership,
First Nation Citizenship, Kinship,
Gender, and Race: Reconsidering
the Role of Federal Law1
Wendy Cornet

Introduction
Under the current Indian Act, responsibility for defining certain First Nation
identities in law is shared between First Nation governments and the federal
parliament. This paper examines human rights and governance issues arising
from current approaches to defining First Nation identities.2
For much of Canada’s history, the legal definitions of “Indian” and “band
member” have been shaped by governments outside First Nation control. This
paper will show that the boundaries of these legal constructs have been defined
predominately through criteria reflecting high levels of arbitrariness, both historically and under the current state of the law. Law in this area has evolved from
a relatively flexible and gender-neutral kinship-based system (1850–1868) to a
patrilineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal kinship-based system involving various
forms of gender-based discrimination (1876–1985) to the current blood quantum
system with some residual gender-based discrimination (1985). The blood
quantum approach is also evident in many band membership and First Nation
citizenship laws. In all cases, definitions that rely solely on a simple in-out classification system of individuals based on descent criteria alone, or discrimination on
grounds of sex, raise serious human rights issues.
Legal definitions of Indian status, band membership, and First Nation citizenship can impact personal identity at the individual level. Consequently, policy
decisions reflected in laws respecting Indian status, band membership, and First
Nation citizenship can affect the enjoyment of individual human rights. Collectively, federal and First Nation laws have created numerous different legal classes
of people of First Nation descent. This complexity can result in arbitrariness with
negative effects on human dignity, personal autonomy, and self-esteem.
Another important consideration is the negative impact of a complex and arcane
system of defining First Nation identities (a system flowing from the Indian Act)
on the capacity of governments at all levels to effectively plan the delivery of vital
programs and services such as health and education.
— 145 —
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In some ways, the legal concept of “Indian” under the Indian Act reflects
prevailing societal myths about race and about “Aboriginality” or “Indianness”
as categories of race. There has been confusion regarding the distinction between
“racial” and “cultural” identities. Many people view the legal concept of Indian
status as a foreign notion imposed on First Nations people. Many (but not all)
people of First Nation descent reject the term “Indian” as a marker of identity and
prefer the term “First Nation.”
Difficulties can arise when individuals discover that the law does not accommodate their self-perception of cultural identity, whether that law is federal or
First Nation in source.

The Role of Federal Law in Defining First Nation
Identities
Law is a product of society and some aspects of Canadian law reflect societal
assumptions about race. The notion of “Indian” in the sense of a “North American
Indian race” is a social and legal abstraction. The influence of socially constructed
notions of race is evident in the history of Indian Affairs policy and the Indian Act
itself.3 The application of the term “Indian” to a multiplicity of diverse cultures,
nations, and language groups is a striking example of how colonialism and other
social forces have created and defined racial categories. The notion of “Indian”
lumps a diverse array of distinct peoples Indigenous to North America into one
legal and racial category—without regard to their own distinct cultural and
political identities. In this way the legal concept of Indian status under the Indian
Act has contributed to the “racialization”4 of First Nation peoples—meaning that
the law has contributed to the imposition of a generic racial category on diverse
peoples Indigenous to Canada.5
An important policy question is whether the goal of ensuring the equality and
cultural rights of First Nation peoples is well served by the continued use in statutes
of the racial term “Indian” (and the federal role of defining this term) or whether
these goals would be better met by First Nation concepts of First Nation citizenship and the use of criteria such as culture and family relationships (kinship) as
well as descent.
Historically, the legal category of “Indian” has served as the basis for specialized legal treatment, sometimes with a positive impact on the rights of First Nation
people, and sometimes with a negative impact. In the past, this specialized legal
treatment often involved discrimination—legal distinctions with negative consequences for the peoples concerned, such as denial of the right to vote (a denial of
an individual civil and political right) or denial of nation recognition (a denial of a
collective right to a specific cultural and national identity). At one time, “Indian”
status meant “not a person,” and denoted a legal incapacity in regard to many
civil and political rights and freedoms. The legal consequences attached to Indian
status have evolved over time. More recently, Canadian law has recognized the
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need for specialized legal treatment of Indians/First Nations as peoples—not
races—to protect the fundamental cultural, social, economic, civil, and political
rights of First Nations as nations and peoples. (An example of this change is the
entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada
in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.) This policy goal is consistent with
international human rights norms respecting the equality of all peoples and their
right to self-determination.
The Indian Act continues to provide a legal framework to define individuals in
and out of identities such as “band member” and “Indian.” Federal law currently
does this by creating an objective standard of “Indianness.” This standard is applied
in an either/or type classification system based on the circumstances of a person’s
birth. This approach carries a great potential for arbitrariness and discrimination.
Any set of rules defining a legal identity based primarily on descent will involve a
degree of arbitrariness—whether it is Indian status, band membership, or citizenship. The greater the degree of arbitrariness, the greater is the potential for harm
to individual identities and rights.
The federal rules now governing Indian status and band membership rely
heavily on descent-based criteria, with rigid cut-off rules to address situations of
Indian–non-Indian parentage. There is little provision under the current Indian
Act for alternate eligibility criteria. In the case of Indian status, for persons
born after April 16, 1985, descent is the only criteria, apart from adoption and
some limited exceptions provided by section 4(1). The simplicity of descentbased criteria presumably makes administration of entitlement less complex
than systems requiring assessment of factors such as cultural knowledge or
degree of connection to a community. However, this simplicity is traded off for
the complexity of delivering diverse government services and programs through
varying criteria of Indian status, First Nation membership/citizenship, or reserve
residency for eligibility or funding purposes. Federal and First Nation law-making
and policy-making face the same challenge in this regard.
Arbitrariness in definitions of Indian status and membership/citizenship has
long been a concern of many First Nations women activists and organizations—
whether the discrimination is based on sex, descent, marital, or family status.
Of course, it is true that Aboriginal rights by definition are the rights attached to
persons connected to the Indigenous peoples in control of their territories prior to
European colonization and this necessarily involves descent criteria to determine
entitlement. However, the rigid descent rules that now typify Indian status entitlement and most band membership rules are a relatively recent development. This
rigidity has the unfortunate consequence of perpetuating colonial notions of race
and also fails to respond to the needs of “bi-racial” or “multi-racial” children.
Federal laws, policies, and funding criteria may influence First Nation–
controlled decisions about band membership criteria. The colonial legacy of
racial categorization may also influence First Nation decision-making in some
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cases. Carole Ambrose-Goldberg has commented on the influence U.S. federal
law can have on tribal identities and definitions in the United States: “Law is one
potentially powerful outside influence on political identity. Explicitly, law may
establish categories of people eligible for benefits or subject to burdens according
to particular understandings of ethnicity or nationality. These definitions may in
turn provide incentives or disincentives for groups to organize politically along
particular lines” (Ambrose-Goldberg 1994, 1123–1124). Ambrose-Goldberg notes
that in the U.S., federal legislation began supplanting treaties in the early nineteenth century and finally took over after 1871. The result was national legislation
that focused on group rights for Indians as a whole (that is, for Indians as a racial
group) rather than the rights of individual tribes (that is, distinct peoples with
rights to maintain their distinct cultures, modes of political organization, law,
etc.) (Ambrose-Goldberg 1994, 1141). Ambrose-Goldberg makes the following
conclusion about the impact of this race-focused legal approach on the Indian
nations themselves: “By classifying all the many native peoples as ‘Indians,’ the
first European invaders generated an idea that has in turn created a reality in its
own image, through non-Indian power and native response … the racially inspired
policies of non-Indians began to reproduce in Indians the original European racebased conceptions” (Ambrose-Goldberg 1994, 1140).
For a long period, aspects of the Indian status and band membership provisions supported federal policy goals of forcibly assimilating First Nation people
as individuals. First Nation women were a key target of assimilative policies
launched through previous Indian Act provisions governing Indian status and
band membership entitlement. Section 12(1)(b) of the pre-1985 Indian Act is
perhaps the most infamous example. This provision removed Indian status from
any woman marrying a person without Indian status and from her children. While
section 12(1)(b) was often rationalized as necessary to protect the reserve base
from exploitation by non-Aboriginal husbands of Indian women, there is no
evidence of alternative measures ever being considered to address this concern
until the legislative process that led to the 1985 amendments.
For some time, First Nation people have struggled to reassert control over
their personal identities as individuals and their collective identities as nations
or peoples. First Nation women activists and organizations have fought for fair
and non-discriminatory systems of determining Indian status and band membership, whether controlled by the federal government or First Nation governments.
Despite the removal of much of the sex-based discrimination from the Indian Act,
the concepts of “Indian” and “band member” remain problematic and residual sex
discrimination is still evident.
The federal government and many First Nations have expressed interest
in moving towards a system that recognizes First Nation citizenship as a legal
concept in place of the Indian Act notion of band membership. Future policy
reforms by the federal government or First Nation governments to reduce arbitrariness should first determine the relevance of notions of “descent” and “race” in
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the development of any new definitions of First Nations identity and the relevance
of alternative criteria such as cultural knowledge and connection to community.
Policy work in this area must also consider how any proposed reforms may
impact men and women differently (e.g., due to the continuing impact of past
discriminatory laws).

Race Creation, Gender-based Discrimination, and
Legal Indian Status
A review of Canadian case law reveals a lack of clarity on whether the legal
category of “Indian” under the Indian Act refers to a racial group, or diverse
cultural and political entities. This can be seen by comparing the 1983 decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Martin v. Chapman6 (which discusses the
legal concept of “Indian” in the racial terminology of “Indian blood”) to the 1999
decision Corbière v. Canada7 (where the Court references both race and culture as
part of the legal conception of “Indian”).8 This is a critical area of legal analysis
that requires clarification (through legislation, judicial decision, or both) if Aboriginal rights within the Canadian legal system are to be understood and analyzed as
rights of peoples or nations, and not as “race-based rights.” This would not affect
the capacity of human rights law to sanction harmful discriminatory action arising
from the ongoing social phenomenon of racial categorization and discrimination
aimed at the members of the diverse Indigenous nations as “Indians.”
The concept of “race” as it has been popularly used in European and Europeanbased societies has changed substantially over the centuries. As Constance
Backhouse explains, it was originally used to mark differences of class within
European society and also to delineate different cultures and societies who often
did not look markedly different from one another.9 In this sense it simply referred
to persons connected by common descent or origin. Backhouse explains: “The
word ‘race’ originally denoted ‘family,’ and was applied only to noble or important
dynasties—the race of the Bourbons and the race of David for example. The term
underwent ‘a semantic journey of extraordinary proportions’ when it expanded
during the nineteenth century to categorize large groups of people who were not
related directly through kinship, but who shared specified traits. Early classifications based almost exclusively on skin colour had enumerated four separate
races: Europaceus albus, Asiaticus luridus, Americanus rufus, and Afer niger”
(Backhouse 1999, 42). Later work relied on a combination of physical features
such as hair texture, skin colour, eye colour, and shape of nose, and resulted in
classification systems of at least seventeen “main races” (Backhouse 1999, 42
citing Otto Klineberg).
With the advent of European colonization of large parts of the globe, the concept
of race evolved as a means of rationalizing different and unequal treatment of
people based on their physical appearance and cultural distinctiveness relative
to people of European descent. With the growth in European scientific activity
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in the nineteenth century, and the ongoing thrust of colonialism, considerable effort was expended to prove some biological or genetic foundation to
the then prevailing systems of racial classification based on physical appearance.
These efforts utterly failed. As many authorities have concluded, race is a social
construct with no scientific foundation (Lopez 1994, 1).
The dehumanizing process of classifying other people into arbitrary racial categories and discriminating against them based on such imposed categories is distinguishable from the process of people self-identifying as nations or distinct peoples
based on shared attributes which may include kinship ties, language, cultural
values, histories, and laws. In the latter situation, the people or nation concerned
have agency in asserting fundamental rights that are protected by domestic and
international law. Such fundamental rights include the right of peoples to selfdetermination, the related Aboriginal and treaty rights of First Nations under the
Canadian Constitution, and rights under international human rights covenants
relating to language and culture.
When the Indian Act was first enacted in the late nineteenth century, EuroCanadian social and legal norms often assigned persons whose ancestry was
outside Europe (including First Nation people and people of Asian and African
descent among others) to various racial categories deemed not “white.” “White”
as a racial category became a standard of privilege and the standard for full
social, economic, and political rights, against which other “races” were identified,
defined, and ranked by decision-makers such as judges or Members of Parliament or Legislatures who considered themselves “white.” Assignment to a racial
category other than “white” often triggered some form of legal disadvantage such
as barriers to voting rights, immigration, or certain kinds of employment. The
history of the evolving nature of legal definitions of racial categories and how
these were manipulated to secure and perpetuate privilege by people asserting
a racial identity as “white” throughout the nineteenth century and half of the
twentieth century has been documented by several authorities.10 It is also evident
that the racialization of First Nation peoples through the Indian Act began to
eclipse the Crown’s recognition of Indigenous nations and the treaties the Crown
had entered into with them.
The legal definition of “Indian” has evolved from its inception in colonial
law in 1850 to the 1985 Indian Act amendments from a flexible, broad definition
relying on a degree of self-identification and community acceptance to an increasingly narrow definition dependent almost solely on descent-based criteria. Over
this period, three distinct approaches can be identified: 1) a flexible gender-neutral
and non-unilineal kinship-based system; 2) a patrilineal and patriarchal kinshipbased system with various manifestations of sex discrimination; and 3) a strict
descent-based system (non-unilineal) with blood quantum requirements and some
residual elements of gender-based discrimination.
While the current Indian status entitlement system does not rely on outward
physical characteristics to classify people, its almost exclusive reliance on strict
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descent-based criteria arguably constitutes a form of race classification. High
levels of arbitrariness characterize systems of race classification. With its focus on
individual descent histories and its exclusion of relationship criteria (e.g. relationship of individuals to families or to communities) the current Indian Act creates
an objective but rigid and arbitrary standard of “Indianness”—one that is to be
determined by federal law alone and applied on a national basis to a diverse group
of nations or peoples. This approach unfortunately implies the existence of some
trait or characteristics that make “Indians” inherently different from those deemed
“not Indian.” The current system offers a binary choice between the categories—“Indian” and “not Indian” based solely on the circumstances of a person’s
parentage. Within the category of “Indian,” two sub-categories have been created
which in turn imply the existence of “degrees of Indianness”—Indians registered
under section 6(1) of the Act and Indians registered under section 6(2). Indians
registered under section 6(1) can pass on Indian status to their children, regardless of who they marry. As noted above, Indians registered under section 6(2) can
only pass on Indian status if the other parent is registered under either section 6(1)
or section 6(2).
The current Indian Act reinforces the notion of “Indian” as a racial category in
the following ways:
• By specifically referring to “Inuit” as a “race” excluded from the
definition of “Indian,” section 4(1)
• By relying strictly on descent-based criteria to determine eligibility for
persons born after 1985
• By creating subcategories of “Indianness”—“6(1) Indians” and “6(2)
Indians” in common parlance today—with different capacities to transmit
Indian status
• By establishing a system that leads over time to an escalating separation
of Indian status from connectedness to the group identity of band or First Nation
• By separating the determination of “Indian” identity from connection to
First Nation land rights
From 1876–1985 Indian status under the federal Indian Act was primarily
determined by a patrilineal kinship system. The result was that gender-based
discrimination was the key tool for meeting the federal policy goal of controlling
and narrowing the class of people of First Nation descent who would be entitled
to Indian status under the Indian Act. Under this system, federal law determined
both entitlement to Indian status and band membership, and there was an almost
total match between those entitled to Indian status and band membership. Entire
nuclear families (husband, wife, children) could move in or out of Indian status
and band membership, based on the status of the father or husband. Descent
from a male person with Indian status or marriage to a male with Indian status
were the primary means of individual entitlement. Conversely, marriage by an
Indian woman to a non-Indian male resulted in loss of Indian status to herself and
her children.
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The 1985 amendments to the Indian Act re-introduced non-unilineal (or
“cognatic”) descent principles whereby descent is now traced through both
maternal and paternal ancestors. Because this approach would dramatically
increase the number of persons entitled to Indian registration, the federal policy
goal of controlling the number meeting the definition of “Indian” is now met by
degree of descent rules. These begin to operate in the first generation of Indian
and non-Indian parentage and lead to disentitlement if there are two successive
generations of Indian and non-Indian parentage. The only deviations from descent
criteria are provisions respecting adoption (in the Act’s definition of “child”) and
the provision that deems band members without Indian status to be “Indians” for
several key provisions of the Act (section 4.1).
There is still residual sex discrimination in the determination of Indian status.
The children of women, who “married-out” prior to 1985 and were reinstated
under the 1985 amendments, are treated differently than the children of men who
married out prior to 1985. The children of women who married out prior to 1985
are registered under section 6(2) while the children of men who “married-out”
are registered under section 6(1). This means that successive generations of intermarriage results in termination of Indian status one generation earlier for women
than for men who married out prior to 1985. In addition to problems arising
from provisions of the Act itself, there are issues arising from DIAND’s policy
respecting “unacknowledged paternity” and “unstated paternity.” Although the
Act does not address evidence of paternity, federal policy does. Where a mother
cannot establish to the satisfaction of the Department, the Indian status of the
father of her child (or who chooses not to) federal policy provides that only on the
mother’s Indian status will be relied on to determine which subsection to register
the child. This policy effectively amounts to deeming the father as not having
status as an “Indian” under the Indian Act. A raft of gender equality issues are
raised by this policy, which have been explored by others.11

Rules Governing Entitlement to Band Membership
Under the Indian Act diverse First Nations, identified as “bands,” are subject to
a more or less uniform system of local governance and reserve land regulation.12
The recognition of distinct “band” entities and brief references to custom bands
and treaties is the closest the Indian Act comes to recognizing diverse Indigenous
cultural or political entities.
Prior to 1985, all band members were deemed to belong to the category of
“Indian.” The Indian Act now allows the development of separate legal rules to
govern Indian status and band membership. Indian status remains determined
solely by the federal rules set out in sections 6 and 7 of the Indian Act. Band
membership continues to coincide with Indian status for bands not taking control
of their membership rules, as provided by section 10 of the Act. Bands who do
assume control over their membership codes may develop rules different from
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those determining Indian status (within certain parameters). For these bands, band
membership can mean something different than Indian status.
The vast majority of bands appear to rely heavily on descent-based criteria as a
pre-condition to entitlement either because their membership rules are governed
by the Indian Act, or where control of membership has been assumed, the rules
rely on descent-based rules.
Some bands restrict eligibility criteria to specific descent rules. Others provide
for some opportunity for the admission of persons not meeting the standard
descent criteria by establishing other criteria such as:
• Demonstrated knowledge of the nation’s language
• Demonstrated knowledge of the nation’s customs and traditions
• Length of residence among the nation
• Social and cultural ties to the nation
• Support from a majority of electors voting by secret ballot on the
application
• Existence of close family ties within the nation
• Is self-supporting or alternatively, can make a valuable contribution to the
band, or is a caring parent who can participate in the betterment of the reserve
• A native or non-native adopted child of a person eligible to be a band member13
First Nations have taken a range of approaches in defining the initial charter
group of persons automatically eligible for band membership. Different cut-off
dates have been established for determining the charter group from which descent
would be traced to determine the eligibility of future generations. Different terms
to name the initial charter group of band members have been used, e.g. “original
members” (Adams Lake Indian Band) or “traditional citizens” (Fort Nelson
Indian Band). Different approaches have been taken to the relevance of Indian
status to eligibility for band membership. The Skeetchestn Indian Band requires
both the applicant and at least one of the applicant’s parents to have Indian status,
in addition to other requirements (Gilbert 1996, 180).
The separation of Indian status from band membership and the differing trends
across First Nations in the numbers entitled to each legal status, results in a complex
array of legal rules to determine access to many important legal rights and benefits.
This is a complex legal field that both nations and individuals must cope with.
Indian status determines eligibility for several significant social programs such
as the Non-Insured Health Benefits. Band membership determines eligibility for
many political and civil rights on-reserve such as voting in band council elections
and the right to hold an individual land allotment. It is also important to note that
the loss of capacity to transmit Indian status or band membership to children due
to “out-marriage” affects women more than men, given rates of Indian/non-Indian
parenting are considerably higher for females than males, both on- and off-reserve
(Gilbert 1996, 180).

This is an excerpt from "Volume 5: Moving Forward, Making a Difference," in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.

Aboriginal Volume 5.indb 153

7/10/07 9:59:13 AM

154  /  Part Four: Legal Issues and Future Directions

The combined effect of rigid, yet differing descent-based rules for Indian
status and band membership, creates a complex legal and policy environment for
federal, provincial, and First Nation governments. This complicates the planning
and delivery of government services and programs on- and off-reserve. The separation of Indian status from band membership is creating an increasingly incoherent
system that fails to reflect the family relationships of First Nation people on- and
off-reserve. Yet another set of legal rights are defined in terms of treaty beneficiary
rights for First Nations who have entered treaties with the Crown. In addition,
some federal programs are based on funding criteria determined by the number
of people resident on-reserve. Moving to a legal system based on recognizing
nations and First Nation citizenship could provide an opportunity to rationalize at
least some of these overlapping legal statuses and funding criteria.

Equality Rights, Notions of “Difference,” and
Legally Created Identities
As a matter of personal identity, each person of First Nation descent is entitled
to choose an identity as Aboriginal, First Nation, or any other. Some people are
comfortable with one or more of the generic terms commonly used today such as
First Nation, Aboriginal, or Indigenous. There are also individuals who refer to
themselves as “Indian.” Still others, with equal legitimacy, do not identify with
any of these generic terms and relate only to their specific national identity (such
as Mi’Kmaq or Nisga’a).
The personal right of individuals to identify themselves is distinct from considering the legal and social consequences of identities created and defined in law,
especially by governments outside the control of the group being defined. Each
individual has the right to shape their own identity to the extent they are able,
or wish to, beyond the influence of their parents, families, cultures, and nations.
However, the capacity of individuals to assert this freedom can be affected by
the broad powers of government to create and define legal categories of people
(subject to constitutional restraints such as the Charter guarantees of equality or
Aboriginal and treaty rights).
Citizenship, band membership, and Indian status are all legally defined categories that necessarily involve defining some people in, and some people out of
each category as well as the rights and benefits attached to each. The first step
to begin addressing concerns about the arbitrariness of current rules relating to
Indian status and band membership is to understand how “difference” is typically
identified and created by Western (meaning, European-derived) systems of law.
The analysis in this chapter relies on the legal theory of American equality rights
theorist, Martha Minow on Western understandings of “difference.”14 Minow
provides several examples demonstrating how categories of difference are created
and defined by law, and how these are often culturally bound. Western notions
of human difference in turn have influenced the development of equality rights
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theory—the legal theory that identifies when different treatment amounts to
discrimination contrary to human rights norms.
Minow observes that the creation of different abstract categories of people
is a common function of the law in European-derived legal systems. She notes
that the operation of American law in any field typically involves distinguishing
things, situations, and people from other things, situations, and people and does so
through the establishment of abstract legal definitions or concepts. However, she
points out that difference is a comparative term and that the very idea of difference implies a reference point to make any given comparison (Minow 1990, 22).
That is, a finding of difference and the assigning of a person to one group rather
than another implies difference from some standard of comparison. Minow states
that a legal system that purports to value individual equality constantly poses the
“dilemma of difference”: sometimes ensuring real or substantive equality requires
treating people the same regardless of personal traits and sometimes equality
requires acknowledging and accommodating differences between people.
Western legal theory, for example, tends to construct dichotomous (opposing)
categories such as gender and sex (male/female). By comparison, in at least one
major Aboriginal language, there are no words to connote “male” and “female”
(Henderson 1996, 1). Further, the idea of “Indians” and “bands” are products of
European colonial law and did not exist prior to European arrival in the Western
Hemisphere. The legal creation of “Indians” has created a need to identify “nonIndians” and a process of distinguishing between the two legal categories of
people. The problem of identifying difference is inherent in issues relating to entitlement to Indian status as well as band membership and First Nation citizenship.
It is inherent in determining when such distinctions amount to discrimination.
Equality rights theory in Canada responds to the dilemma of difference by
identifying legal distinctions that harm human dignity and personal autonomy.
For example, a decision to exclude a person from a benefit under the law because
of a personal characteristic—such as sex or race—in a way that implies the
person is of less value because of that personal characteristic, can be a form of
discrimination.
Laws and government decisions which impair human dignity carry the potential
to negatively affect self-esteem and the process of identity formation in young
people. Policy makers should consider the impact on young First Nation people
of having to cope with, and find their place in, a confusing array of legal statuses
somehow related to their family histories (e.g. Status Indian, Non-Status Indian,
C-31 Indian, 6(1) Indian, 6(2) Indian, band member, non-band member, Treaty
Indian). Some of these legal categories may overlap when applied to a particular
individual and some may not. A further consideration is that multiracial children
not only face the complexities of identity formation in a race-conscious society,
but also a legal system that establishes multiple categories of First Nation people.
The key focus of policy reform should be on moving away from legal categories
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that racialize people into categories and subcategories. Instead, policy could
promote the development of First Nation–controlled legal systems that define
citizenship in ways reflecting First Nation cultural identities while respecting the
fundamental dignity and equality of First Nation men, women, and children. This
may require development of kinship rules that meet the contemporary needs of
the family situations of First Nation people. Movement in this direction would be
consistent with the conclusions of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
which stated that the distinctiveness of Aboriginal people is cultural and political,
not “racial”: “Aboriginal peoples are not racial groups; rather they are organic
political and cultural entities. Although contemporary Aboriginal groups stem
historically from the original peoples of North America, they often have mixed
genetic heritages and include individuals of varied ancestry. As organic political
entities, they have the capacity to evolve over time and change in their internal
composition.”15
Determining when a distinction in law or policy amounts to discrimination
is not always easy. While all discrimination necessarily involves some form of
identifying difference between two categories of people, not all legal distinctions amount to discrimination under Canadian law (whether the Charter is being
applied or federal or provincial human rights legislation).
The purpose of Canadian anti-discrimination law is to identify and provide
remedies for arbitrary legal distinctions that impose real disadvantage—disadvantage
based on negative stereotypes attached to a personal characteristic, such as sex or race,
or multiple personal characteristics at the same time. When the result of applying
such stereotypes and disadvantage is impairment of a person’s dignity as a human
being, discrimination is usually found to exist as a matter of law. For example, a
provision of the Indian Act that prohibited off-reserve band members from voting
in band council elections has been held a violation of section 15 Charter equality
rights in Corbière v. Canada.16 The exclusion of band members living off-reserve
from participation in a key part of the political life of Indian Act bands was found
to be an impairment of the human dignity of the members affected, because the
exclusion: 1) suggested that off-reserve band members were less worthy as band
members and 2) perpetuated a longstanding stereotype that off-reserve band
members are necessarily more culturally assimilated than members resident
on-reserve.
Martha Minow’s theory of how the law creates and shapes notions of “difference” can be used to better understand Indian status and band membership issues
in Canadian law. Drawing on theories from a range of disciplines including
sociology, law, and psychology, Minow describes “a social relations approach”
to addressing perceptions of difference within an equality rights framework
(Minow 1990, 12). Minow suggests that a social relations approach to law focuses
on identifying the relationships and interdependency of people, as an essential part
of the context for making decisions on rights related questions. A social relations
approach takes into consideration the dynamic and evolving nature of human
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relationships, and adopts the view that legal distinctions do not necessarily,
and often do not, reflect differences inherent in the people assigned to different
legal categories. In a Canadian context, this suggests that rigid in/out definitions
will likely not take account of the diversity of family relationships nor how the
mobility of First Nation people to seek employment or education off-reserve often
influences their choice of partners.
The arbitrariness of strict descent-based criteria perhaps could be alleviated by
moving away from strict either/or classification approaches determined only by
descent and instead develop codes that reflect the inherent nature of human relationships as dynamic, evolving, and interconnected. It may also help to keep in
mind that legal distinctions between “Indian” and “non-Indian” under the Indian
Act do not necessarily reflect real differences inherent in the persons concerned.

Notions of Citizenship
Citizenship is a legal status that brings with it a specific political identity and
specific rights and obligations. The definition of citizenship and its rights and
responsibilities are controlled by the government of the nation in question. Citizenship is a legal concept determined by specific events (such as being born in a
certain territory or being born to parents with a particular citizenship or meeting
the requirements of a naturalization process) and not by qualities inherent in a person.
Prior to 1947, there was no such thing as Canadian citizenship, as all Canadians
were simply considered British subjects (Young 1997). The British common law
system historically determined an individual’s entitlement to citizenship by the
place of birth (jus soli), regardless of the citizenship of the parents. European
countries whose legal systems derive from Roman law historically relied on the
citizenship of the parents (jus sanguinis) to determine the citizenship of a child.
Other countries such as Japan have similar rules.
Canadian law provides three means of acquiring Canadian citizenship: 1) being
born on Canadian soil; 2) being born to at least one parent with Canadian citizenship;
and 3) if not automatically entitled by birth (either by place of birth or by blood)
through “naturalization.”
The notion of band membership does bear some resemblance to the concept of
citizenship. Traditionally, entitlement to band membership and Indian status has
been determined by the specifics of the parents’ entitlement to band membership
and Indian status. Since the 1985 amendments to the Indian Act, bands have been
able to take control of their membership rules and use criteria other than descent
either in addition to, or as an alternative to, descent criteria. Unlike Canadian
citizenship, birth in a First Nation’s territory such as a reserve typically does not
confer band membership. Given the small numbers of people of First Nation
descent relative to people with no First Nations descent on a national basis, such
rules could undermine the transmission and survival of First Nations cultural values.
First Nation citizenship codes can determine access to civil, political, and
social rights within First Nation communities. First Nation citizenship, like band
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membership, raises difficult policy issues involving personal identities. When
personal identities do not match the legal rules determining citizenship rights,
lack of access to important cultural rights tied to civil, political, and social rights
within First Nation communities are felt as particular hardships by persons falling
outside definitions of band membership or First Nation citizenship. Citizenship and
band membership codes necessarily involve establishing rules for the inclusion or
exclusion of individuals. Like citizenship laws of other nations, citizenship codes
likely will be the focus of ongoing controversy and feelings of hurt and injustice
by those seeking inclusion but failing to meet citizenship requirements. However,
First Nation lawmakers could seek to reduce arbitrariness through codes that
focus on relationships and connection to community as well as descent, and by
continuing dialogue within their communities on citizenship issues.
There has been a strong interest in moving away from the Indian Act concept of
“bands” and “band membership” to a more respectful terminology of “Nation” and
“First Nation citizenship.” First Nation representatives have said that the system
of bands imposed by the Indian Act does not reflect the traditional nations in
which Indigenous people organized themselves prior to colonization. The Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples noted that before colonization there were
approximately 80 to 90 distinct peoples or nations in the territory now known
as Canada. The 600 plus bands recognized under the Indian Act do not necessarily reflect the traditional political organization of First Nations in Canada, as
nations. While Aboriginal nations are understood to often encompass more than
one Indian Act band, there is a noticeable trend particularly in federal legislation,
to equate the legal term “band” with “First Nation.” The term First Nation citizenship today is often used to refer to the same unit as band membership.
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples concluded that First Nations
have the right to determine their membership as an element of their inherent right
of self-government. Significantly, the Commission also concluded this right is
limited by two requirements: 1) to ensure no discrimination between men and
women, and 2) there should be no reliance on minimum blood quantum as
a “general pre-requisite” for citizenship: “Under section 35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982, an Aboriginal nation has the right to determine which individuals
belong to the nation as members and citizens. However, this right is subject to
two basic limitations. First, it cannot be exercised in a manner that discriminates
between men and women. Second, it cannot specify a minimum blood quantum
as a general prerequisite for citizenship. Modern Aboriginal nations, like other
nations in the world today, represent a mixture of genetic heritages. Their identity
lies in their collective life, their history, ancestry, culture, values, traditions, and
ties to the land, rather than in their race as such.”17
Kimberley Tallbear has argued against the use of rigid blood quantum criteria
in contemporary First Nation laws on membership or citizenship and against
assumptions that equate race with culture or blood quantum with transmission
of culture. She states that prior to colonization, there were First Nations that used
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nonracial criteria to determine citizenship such as “marrying into the community,
long-term residence within the tribal community, and the assumption of cultural
norms such as language, religion, and other practices” (see Tallbear 20012000).
The types of band membership rules described in Clatworthy’s studies of banddesigned membership codes are different in some important ways from the legal
definition of Canadian citizenship. Entitlement to Canadian citizenship is determined by birth in Canadian territory. In addition, it can be acquired by persons
born outside Canada if born to a Canadian or meeting the requirements of naturalization. By contrast, band membership and Indian status are largely determined by
descent from persons with Indian status or band membership, regardless of where
a person is born. Band membership can be extended to persons not entitled to it
by birth if the band membership rules so provide. The fact of colonization and
its resulting loss of land and control over traditional territory place First Nations
in a very different situation than Canada with respect to “immigration” norms
and citizenship. Presumably acquisition of citizenship by birth in First Nations
territory is not attractive to many, because of the threat of being overwhelmed
eventually by non-Aboriginal people. Canada, on the other hand, promotes immigration and acquisition of Canadian citizenship as a social and economic benefit
to the country as a whole.
It should also be kept in mind that descent has been a relevant factor for passing
on Canadian citizenship, and cut-off rules have been used regarding children of
Canadian citizens born abroad. Gender-based discrimination in the operation
of such rules has been found unconstitutional. A sexually discriminatory rule
that permitted a married Canadian father to pass on his citizenship but not a
Canadian mother was found an unconstitutional violation of section 15 in Benner
v. Canada.18
First Nation citizenship as a concept could invoke notions of political membership, cultural affiliation and family relationships rather than colonial notions of race
based on rigid descent rules alone. Legislation to introduce a new system of nation
recognition to replace the current system of band recognition would be consistent
with the right of First Nations to self-government and self-determination and could
include provision for human rights protection. Concerns about the need to respect
equality rights within the nation (whether gender equality concerns, treatment of
on- and off-reserve members, or other differences) could be addressed by the application of the Canadian Human Rights Act, the Charter or First Nation–designed
human rights instruments consistent with international human rights standards.

Conclusion
The number and complexity of legal statuses for First Nation people have grown
over the years. New forms of arbitrary discrimination in definitions of Indian
status and band membership have replaced old ones. The various legal statuses for
Aboriginal people under Canadian law—such as “Indian,” “band member,” and
“treaty beneficiary”—overlap but do not always coincide.
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Arbitrariness could be reduced by focusing more on the relationships between
people as a context for developing laws to determine First Nation identity categories such as membership or citizenship. This would mean focusing on the
contemporary context and manifestation of First Nation kinship and determining
how this is relevant to citizenship. Such a focus may involve taking account of
factors such as degree of participation in the life of the community, residence in
community, community acceptance, contributions to the First Nation, or support
of family in the community or other community members. Other objective factors
might include an assessment of cultural knowledge or knowledge of the nation’s
language. Any or several such factors could be used as alternative criteria for
people not meeting descent-based criteria. While some First Nations already have
incorporated such criteria into their band membership codes, rigid descent criteria
still appear to be the predominant and only determinant for many membership
codes to date as the work of Stewart Clatworthy demonstrates.
Aboriginal people must cope with layers of legal identities beyond their
control but vital to their lives. Understanding these rules and falling within the
recognition they offer can mean the difference between being able to reside onreserve or not, being able to buy a house on-reserve or not, having access to postsecondary education, employment training, and other programs. The current level
of complexity and arbitrariness in the legal rules governing Indian status and band
membership also creates impractical burdens for administrators and leaders of
First Nations, and confusion and conflict for First Nation individuals attempting
to find their way through a mass of technical rules coming from federal and First
Nation sources.
At a broader level, the concepts of Indian status and band membership themselves are problematic. The legal notion of “Indian” perpetuates the notion of a
universal “Indian” race and undermines recognition of the distinct nation status
of the diverse First Nations of Canada. Similarly, the notions of “band” and “band
membership” do not promote recognition of First Nations as nations.
Some alternative policy choices to revise the Indian status and band membership provisions under the current Indian Act could include:
1) Focus on eliminating residual sex discrimination in the existing system
including addressing policy issues respecting: a) “ unstated paternity”;
b) discriminatory treatment of the children of Indian women who “married
out” before 1985 with respect to Indian status and band membership; and
c) discriminatory treatment of children of female “illegitimate” children
with respect to band membership
2) Recognize two legal sources for Indian status entitlement by amending
section 4.1 of the Indian Act so that: a) all persons with band membership
as determined by bands would be deemed “Indians” for all provisions of
the Indian Act and other federal purposes such as funding formulas;  and b)
persons without band membership would continue to be eligible for Indian
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status according to federal law
3) Eliminate the concept of Indian status and use band membership/First
Nation citizenship as the primary legal status for federal and constitutional
matters relating to First Nations
4) Replace Indian status and band membership systems with First Nation citizenship codes as determined by First Nation laws
Historically, First Nation women have been subject to various forms of discrimination in regard to Indian status and band membership entitlement. Any initiative
to examine law and policy relating to Indian status and band membership will
require a gender-based analysis to address the various layers of discrimination to
which women and children reinstated under the 1985 amendments to the Indian
Act have been made subject—including discrimination based on sex, race, marital
status and family status. To address concerns about the need to protect against
new forms of sex discrimination in future laws, the Canadian Human Rights Act
could be amended to ensure a fuller application to First Nation laws, pending
the development of First Nation human rights codes consistent with international
human rights norms. An interpretive clause to take account of the need to balance
individual rights with collective Aboriginal, treaty and self-government rights
would likely be required (as recommended by the Canadian Human Rights Act
Review Panel). The addition of new responsibilities would require additional
resources to ensure that access to the Commission’s complaint process by First
Nation people is more than theoretical. Locally accessible mechanisms—such as
mediation, tribunals, and courts—to deal with conflicts over membership or citizenship decisions are also needed.
A policy shift respecting the concept of Indian status under the Indian Act
(without affecting the different legal meaning of “Indian” under the Constitution
Act, 1867 and Constitution Act, 1982) would require a fundamental rethinking
of the role and purpose of federal legislation in this area. This may involve new
legislation or a treaty process providing a procedure for recognizing First Nations
without again contributing to the racialization of the diverse nations concerned.
The same legislation could require that citizenship codes respect fundamental
human rights.
There could be advantages to ultimately eliminating the federally created legal
statuses of “Indian” and band membership and moving to recognize First Nation
citizenship more broadly than it is now. Returning to the use of one primary legal
status to identify beneficiaries of rights in relation to First Nation lands and selfgovernment would reduce the multiple combinations and permutations of Indian
status and band membership within the same families.
Overall, it is a fair conclusion to say that First Nation people as a whole are
not well served by a legal category like Indian status, which has done much to
contribute to the myth of a single biologically based North American Indian race. In
addition, the growing demographic dissonance in Canada between those entitled to
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Indian status and those entitled to band membership will be an increasing challenge
for governments (federal, provincial, and First Nation) charged with delivering
programs and services to First Nation people whether on- or off-reserves.
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Endnotes
1 This paper is a revision and updating of an unpublished paper by the author entitled “First Nation
Identities and Individual Equality Rights: A Discussion of Citizenship, Band Membership, and
Indian Status,” January 2003.
2 Issues relating to the inherent right of self-government are not discussed in any depth due to
limitations of space.
3 For discussions on the social construction of “race”, see Omi and Winant (1986), Jackson
(1987, 3), Lock (1999, 83), Lopez (1994, 1), Powell (1997, 99), and Tallbear (2001 and 2000).
4 The term “racialization of identity” is used by Cheryl Harris in her article, “Whiteness as
Property,” p. 1709.
5 See also Turpel-Lafond (1997, 64–66) and Cornet (2003, 121–147) .
6 [1983] 1 S.C.R. 365 (S.C.C.).
7 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 (S.C.C.).
8 For detailed discussion of this issue see, Cornet (2003).
9 See also Backhouse (1999, 5) and Lock (1999); Margaret Lock also provides a review of the
historical meanings of race and notes its early usage to determine matters of kinship and thus its
concern with descent and genealogy, not outward physical appearance.
10 See for example, Backhouse (1999) or McCalla and Satzewich (2002, 25).
11		 The demographic trends in regard to unstated paternity and some of the program and policy
implications of these trends are examined by Clatworthy (2003) and Mann (2005).
12 However, there are opportunities to opt out of the Indian Act reserve land system and establish a
First Nations–designed land management regime under the First Nations Land Management Act,
S.C. 1999, C.24.
13 These observations are based on the codes reviewed in Gilbert (1996). Any of these membership
codes since may have been modified.
14 Martha Minow is an American legal expert on the nature of equality and on issues of identity and
equality rights. See in particular, Minow (1990).
15 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Volume 5, Chapter 3.
16 Corbière v. Canada, [1999] S.C.J. No. 24, 2 S.C.R. 203, (1999) 173 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 239 N.R. 1,
[1999] 3 C.N.L.R. 19 (S.C.C.).
17 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Volume 5, Chapter 3.
18 [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358.
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